When a party creates a problem and then demands payment to resolve it, that constitutes extortion rather than negotiation. Yet this model increasingly characterizes Western dealings with terrorist organizations and rogue regimes.
Hamas exemplifies this approach. Nearly three years after the October 7, 2023 attacks - which included civilian casualties, hostage-taking, and a war causing suffering to Israelis and Palestinians - the organization reportedly insists it will not disarm before Israel withdraws from Gaza. The group that initiated the conflict now demands guarantees before surrendering the weapons that enabled it.
Iran employs a comparable strategy, threatening international shipping, sponsoring proxy attacks across the Middle East, menacing neighbors, and raising concerns about freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. When tensions escalate, the international community discusses what incentives, guarantees, or concessions might persuade Iran to reduce aggression it initiated.
This pattern recurs consistently: the aggressor creates the crisis while the world pressures others to resolve it. Military weakness does not explain this dynamic. Hamas has sustained enormous losses. Hezbollah has been battered. Iran and its proxy network have experienced serious setbacks. Yet military weakness and political use differ fundamentally.
Terrorist organizations and revolutionary regimes understand that survival, not victory, suffices. Democratic governments remain accountable to voters concerned about energy prices, prolonged conflicts, civilian casualties, commercial disruptions, and wider wars. They therefore pursue stability. Terrorist organizations and revolutionary regimes exploit this preference.
For such groups, violence constitutes policy itself. So, the side initiating conflict often faces less pressure than the side attempting to stop it. When Hamas refuses disarmament, debate shifts to Israeli concessions. When Iran threatens stability, discussion turns to American and allied restraint.
The burden migrates from aggressor to target. This teaches a dangerous lesson: creating crises becomes rational strategy if each produces diplomatic attention, economic incentives, political concessions, or military restraint.
The pattern extends beyond Israel. Russia employs variations in Europe. China tests it in the Pacific. North Korea has practiced it for decades. Each creates instability, raises stakes, then negotiates over returning to pre-provocation conditions.
The international community treats restoration of normal behavior as a concession deserving reward. It is not. A terrorist organization deserves no credit for ceasing terrorism. A regime deserves no compensation for refraining from unlawful attacks.
Diplomacy remains essential to statecraft, but it must carry consequences. No withdrawal should precede verified disarmament. No sanctions relief should precede verified compliance. No agreement should depend solely on promises from parties with histories of violating agreements. No aggressor should receive benefits for suspending behavior that should never have occurred.
After October 7, the principle became clear: intentions matter less than capabilities. The pattern has repeated for decades across different actors and regions, but the underlying strategy remains consistent. Aggression precedes international demands for restraint, followed by negotiation over what must be offered to stop unlawful conduct.
Until this dynamic changes, aggressors will continue learning the same lesson: create a crisis, survive the response, and await pressure on victims to make concessions. This path leads not to peace but incentivizes endless conflict.